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Previous research into problem solving in physics resulted in researchers introducing six epistemic
games to describe the organizational structures of locally coherent resources. We present a new epistemic
game—the ‘‘answer-making epistemic game’’—which was identified in this paper through the analysis of
interviews carried out to validate a survey focusing on students’ understanding of Archimedes’ principle
and Pascal’s law. In the game, the ultimate goal is a solution to a problem posed by the survey. Students
may remember or intuit an answer, then use conceptual and/or mathematical reasoning to justify it.
Alternately, they may use conceptual and/or mathematical reasoning to generate an answer. We
demonstrate how students generate their solutions using these two different paths and discuss some
implications for instruction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of epistemic games (e-games) was first intro-
duced as a set of rules and strategies that guide inquiry,
focusing on expert scientific inquiry across disciplines [1].
Tuminaro and Redish [2,3] subsequently generalized
e-games to be descriptive rather than normative, and gen-
eralized the theory to include introductory physics students
as well as experts. They define an epistemic game as:
‘‘A coherent activity that uses particular kinds of knowl-
edge and processes associated with that knowledge to
create knowledge or solve a problem.’’
Each epistemic game has both ontological components
and structural components. The ontological components
are the knowledge base and the epistemic form. The
knowledge base is all the resources [4] students draw on
when they are playing an epistemic game. The epistemic
form is the structure (often referred to as the target struc-
ture) which helps guide the activity. For example, in a
physics problem solving e-game, an epistemic form could
be a series of steps that guides the progression in the
problem-solving activity. Simultaneously, the structural
components include the entry and exit conditions for the
game as well as the moves made during the game. The
entry and exit conditions (which are determined by the
students participating in the game) decide the starting and
ending points of each epistemic game. All steps between
the starting and ending points of an epistemic game are
considered moves which help progress a particular game to
completion.
In university introductory classes, students often assess
their perception of what the learning environment is asking
of them and then frame their activities appropriately.
Framing is an active bringing together of several resources
in an effort to understand and work within a situation [5].
In contrast to framing, e-framing is a perception (uncon-
scious or conscious) of what tools and skills are needed in a
particular context or situation. E-frames can be envisioned
as a storage area for conceptual and procedural resources,
promoting some resources activation and blocking others.
An individual’s framing consists of many components, but
Tuminaro uses the skills and epistemological components
of an individual’s framing to categorize e-games [3].
When students frame an activity as needing a certain
set of skills and involving a certain type of knowledge,
then they may enter into a particular e-game. For example,
the ‘‘Recursive Plug-and-Chug’’ e-game identified by
Tuminaro [3] is one in which students plug quantities
into physics equations in order to achieve a numerical
answer without ever understanding the conceptual under-
standing underlying their calculations. University intro-
ductory classes produce the opportunity to enter into this
type of e-game. Another common occurrence in an intro-
ductory physics class is completing the worksheet and
getting the answers, in which students operate in a frame
known as ‘‘answer making’’ [6]. This is different from a
sense-making frame in which students frame their activ-
ities as making sense of the world.
In this paper, we introduce a new e-game: the ‘‘answer-
making epistemic game’’ (AMEG). This e-game was dis-
covered while members of the research group were in the
process of validating a task that was to be used to evaluate
students’ learning of Archimedes’ principle and Pascal’s
law post hydrostatics instruction. The task consisted of
several questions, the majority of which were multiple
choice. On review we found that students were engaging
in the AMEG when they were answer making on the
multiple-choice conceptual questions which were very
similar in design to those found on common conceptual
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surveys like the Force Concept Inventory [7] or Conceptual
Survey of Electricity and Magnetism [8]. It is our intention
to highlight that this is an e-game that we have observed
within this context of a validation interview of multiple-
choice questions on hydrostatics that may be transferable
to other contexts. Its applicability to other contexts is not
addressed in this paper, however, we believe it is plausible
that students engage in this game in other contexts. In this
paper we focus on the properties of the AMEG as seen in
the hydrostatics validation data; our intent is also not to
expand on the literature on students’ ideas in hydrostatics.
Previous research on hydrostatics [9,10] has indicated
that students have difficulties with hydrostatics concepts
such as Archimedes’ principle. It has also indicated that
students have difficulty explaining the sinking and floating
behavior of objects and are unable to identify the forces
exerted on an object by a fluid. In the past, research has
indicated that students have a tendency to make ex post
facto explanations to justify an intuition they have about a
hydrostatics principle, which makes it an interesting topic
in which to explore answer making.
II. STUDY DESIGN
The data in this paper are drawn from clinical interviews
with students enrolled in an introductory calculus-based
physics class taken primarily by engineering majors. The
course consists of two one-hour lectures and two two-hour
combined recitation laboratories called ‘‘studios’’ each
week for 15 weeks. Homework for this course uses an
online homework system (MasteringPhysics) which
encourages students to submit correct answers and cannot
grade them on their problem-solving process. At the time
of the interviews, the class had recently covered hydro-
statics for 2.5 weeks in lecture and studio.
The thrust of the interviews was to validate a short task
on Archimedes’ principle and Pascal’s law; thus, the pro-
tocol asked students to solve ten related problems in
multiple-choice or free-response format. Students were
instructed to think aloud as they solved problems, and
encouraged to share their reasoning as well as their
answers. Though they had recently covered hydrostatics
in class, our interviews were the students’ first exposure to
our questions: we did not release questions ahead of time to
students, and the questions were not drawn directly from
their course work. Conversely, the problems on the hydro-
statics assessment were similar to canonical ones in hydro-
statics, and ‘‘fair game’’ for students in this course.
Initially, we were not expecting to see students produce
answers followed by justification; rather, we expected
reasoning followed by answers. This violation of our ex-
pectations for students’ problem-solving strategies
prompted us to examine the games students play in more
detail. We observed that five students consistently behaved
similarly in the interviews, using the same kind of strat-
egies to answer the questions. We infer that they use
similar mental processes and frame the activity similarly.
All of the data collected from their clinical interviews fits
within the AMEG, as we will show in the next section.
III. ANSWER-MAKING EPISTEMIC GAME
Answer making, as an epistemic frame, is marked by
student behaviors like worksheet completion and getting
the right answer. It sits in contrast to sense making, in
which students try to figure out phenomena about the
physical world. Behaviors associated with sense making
include making connections to the real world or lived
experience, coordinating multiple representations, consid-
ering the reasonableness of solutions, and treating the
problem as a sensible one to solve. Within that framing,
we note that students regularly perform the same series of
moves in solving problems, detailed in Fig. 1.
A. Structure
Within the AMEG, the ultimate goal is to produce an
answer to the worksheet problem together with some (per-
haps minimal) justification or reasoning for the answer (the
‘‘sufficient solution’’). The entry condition for the AMEG
is students asking themselves if they remember the answer
to the problem, and (if not) if they can quickly intuit an
answer. If they can either remember or intuit an answer,
they embark on the answer leads to justification (AJ) path.
If not, they embark on the reasoning leads to answer (RA)
path. The structure of the game is shown in Fig. 1.
The two paths differ substantially in the role that the
answer to the question plays. In the AJ path, the answer
occurs first. The justification reassures the student that her
previously chosen answer is correct. In contrast, on the RA
path, the student’s reasoning leads her to an answer. Both
paths reach the same end condition of a sufficient solution,
but the answers originate in two different places: the RA
path to the sufficient solution is based firmly in a more
rigorous reasoning process than the AJ path. The distinc-
tion between the AJ and RA paths opens up the possibility
that students will try to justify answers that are different
from the ones they would arrive at through reasoning [11].
FIG. 1. The answer-making e-game. Upper box: Answer leads
to Justification (AJ) path. Lower box: Reasoning leads to Answer
(RA) path. Shading indicates the justification and reasoning
moves.
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When we examine the kinds of reasoning or justification
on both paths, we notice that students first engage in
conceptual reasoning to justify the remembered or intuited
answer (AJ path) or to generate a new one (RA path). If the
student feels the conceptual reasoning is sufficient and
complete, he either uses it to generate an answer (RA
path) or to justify his preexisting remembered or intuited
answer (AJ path), and exits the game with a sufficient
solution.
If the conceptual reasoning fails—either because the
student feels confused or because he cannot remember
the concepts—he turns to mathematics. It is important to
note that students make their own judgments as to whether
or not conceptual reasoning has failed them: the original
intent of the interviews was to validate a brief hydrostatics
assessment, not to teach students or uncover new ideas
about students’ understanding of the subject material, and
so the interviewer did not press students about the correct-
ness or completeness of their ideas.
Should students turn to ‘‘do math,’’ their initial math
attempts are usually not very rigorous: they do not start
from first principles, they do not distinguish between den-
sities of different substances (with subscripts, for ex-
ample), and/or they may leave out some terms altogether.
If the initial math does not yield an answer, students
engage in more rigorous or elaborate math. This can end
up in a circular pattern of many iterations of doing more
math until a sufficient justification (AJ path) or reasoning
(RA path) is reached. As with the conceptual step, students
make their own judgments about whether their justification
or reasoning is sufficient and satisfying.
These moves are based on the analysis of five students
answering multiple questions with each individual stu-
dent often using different moves in different questions.
Each student engaged in both paths of the AMEG, and
we find that features of this game are consistent across
multiple problems and multiple students. It is possible
that a more extensive data set could uncover additional
moves, such as what happens when do math fails. In the
next section, we present two examples of students using
the game.
B. Ontology
In regards to the ontological components, the knowledge
base for the three moves of ‘‘remember,’’ ‘‘intuition,’’ and
‘‘conceptual reasoning’’ are generated from the students’
formal physics resources and common sense resources.
Students often rely on their own knowledge of physics
they have developed and not on direct reference to physics
principles. However, the knowledge base shifts when stu-
dents are confronted by problems in which it is more
arduous to construct a justifiable answer. This was often
the case in problems we think are harder. Students had to
resort to several moves of ‘‘do some math,’’ eliciting more
formal physics and mathematics resources.
The epistemic form of this game could be described as a
truth table. The structure and rules are based on a ‘‘yes’’
and ‘‘no’’ protocol which in the latter parts of the e-game
combines with the mathematical expressions that students
write down during the process of problem solving. This is
in accordance with descriptions of epistemic forms as the
squares that are filled out in tic-tac-toe, or the list for a list
making game [3].
IV. A STUDENT PLAYS THE AMEG
We will present a case study of a student which demon-
strates how students play the AMEG. The case study
illustrates examples of both possible paths for the AMEG
indicated in Fig. 1 and highlights what we observed from
all of the interviews: a singular student will take different
paths dependent on the relative difficulty of the problem
and which resources they activate. We divide the discus-
sion into three examples which correspond to different
options of this game. The student demonstrates several
different moves in two different problems. ‘‘Remember
the result’’ is covered by one problem about water levels
in three different containers that are differently shaped but
all connected together. Intuition, conceptual reasoning, and
do some math are covered by the boy in the tub problem
illustrated in Fig. 2.
A. Remember the result
Students often believe what they have previously
observed and experienced to be right, and accept concep-
tions derived from these experiences without difficulty.
Because of these conceptions being built upon what has
been observed and experienced students often do not build
an explanation or justification for the concepts until
required. In this context it was observed that students
will remember the answer and then in order to make
sense of their answer they will attempt to build a justifica-
tion for it.
FIG. 2. The boy and tub problem.
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In this example the student is quite certain that he
remembers the answer from a similar experiment he had
previously conducted, but his memory does not extend to
the reasoning as to why the answer is as he remembers. The
context of this problem is the previously discussed scenario
of asking the student what the final water level will be of
three containers of water of different shapes that are all
connected to each other.
Student: My first thought, when I think of this problem,
is back in high school physics and physics class I am
taking right now. We always did the experiment with
some crazy shaped containers; where each of the
different containers for water was different, but they
were all connected underneath. And the water level
was always the same. Because, ah, the actual reason I
cannot completely remember, but I do know that’s the
answer.
Interviewer: So you reason like that because saw that,
it’s true, right?
Student: Ah, that’s my, ah, that’s my first thought. . .yes,
I should know the actual reason, hmm. . .I am pretty
sure, because. . .err. . .the pressure is equal on the top
of each of these, but there is a pressure difference. . .
I just know the shape of the container does not matter.
When prompted, he constructs a postfact justification
for his answer. In this context the student perceives that
he cannot just provide the answer and instead must
provide a justification for his answer. His justification is
minimal, but by mentioning that his answer is something
to do with pressure is enough justification to meet the
required end condition and so exits the AMEG quickly,
repeating that ‘‘I just know the shape of the container
doesn’t matter.’’
B. Intuition and conceptual reasoning
The same student as above plays the answer-making
e-game in the following problem (Fig. 2). This time the
student uses several iterations of AMEG because the prob-
lem is being a multiple-choice multiple response question
and he considers each choice separately. The student starts
at the entry condition of remember, but quickly indicates
that he cannot remember any prior result for any of the
choices.
He then returns to A and chooses an intuitive answer: the
water level will not change if the crew member stays in the
tub (thus, by that assertion answers A and B are correct).
Without calculation or much thinking, or any clue from
memory as that in the remember move, the student made
his conclusion at once. This is what we called the intuition
move (sometimes the students would say ‘‘based on intu-
ition, the answer should be. . .’’). Then he justifies his
choice as follows:
Student: Obviously, if one little crew member comes out
of the boat, the water level, or the boat rise a little bit in
the water, and it would increase the, or decrease the
water level in the bath tub. But that same figure’s been
placed in the water, so it’s making up for the amount
that, or the change on the, where is it, the water level of
that the boat does. So these would have. . .no net change
I believe.
For completeness, the student then formally evaluates
each given answer choice, starting with C, followed by B.
When he continues to specifically evaluate answer C (the
crew member leaves the tub), he says that ‘‘I know for sure
that C is true, because as I’ve explained earlier, if the boat
weight is less it’s gonna displace less, or it’s gonna float
higher in the water, and displace less fluid, so, therefore,
the water level would drop a little bit. So C is definitely
right.’’
C. Do some math
When the student evaluates answer B, he starts with the
kind of intuitive reasoning that allowed him to evaluate C.
However, he confuses himself and cannot come to an
answer:
Student: B, I’m not sure, because I’m trying to think,
whether or not, the amount of the water, the amount of
the displacement that the, or the change of the displace-
ment of the boat would be equal to the change of the
displacement of the person being added to the water. If
those two displacements are equal, then yes; or then no,
it doesn’t change the water level.
He stops talking, and starts to write down all equations
relating buoyancy to weight. After that, he decides that the
buoyancy force depends on the volume displaced. He was
not completely sure about answer B being correct and
thinks about this for a minute, at the end of which he states
confidently, ‘‘Yeah, I believe this one [B] doesn’t change
the water level in the bath tub.’’ He justifies his answer with
mathematics, writing down several formulas and referring
to them.
His extended work with answer choice B is replicated
when he returns to work with answer A: conceptual rea-
soning which fails to yield an answer followed by fruitful
mathematics.
V. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER E-GAMES
Some moves in our e-game have some obvious similar-
ities to the e-games identified by Tuminaro and Redish [2].
In particular, Physical Mechanism, Mapping Meaning to
Mathematics, Mapping Mathematics to Meaning, and
Pictorial Analysis are also closely related to the AMEG.
We contend that the AMEG is of a larger scale than any of
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those games, and may help students coordinate choices
between which subgame to play.
The presence of the intuition move and then building
justification to exiting holds the similar ontological com-
ponents as their Physical Mechanism game. We distin-
guish the AMEG from Physical Mechanism in two ways:
the AMEG has several more possible moves; in the
Physical Mechanism game, the end condition requires
students to evaluate the conceptual story that they devel-
oped. In the AMEG, students are often not trying to tell a
conceptual story but instead are trying to build a justifi-
cation for either their remembered or intuitive answer.
The AMEG also differs in entry conditions from the
Physical Mechanism game, whose sole entry condition
is an intuitive belief about a physical mechanism. In the
AMEG, one can start with a remembered answer or an
intuitive belief, or use conceptual reasoning or mathe-
matics to generate an answer. Constantly seeking a suffi-
cient solution may lead students to math and equations,
components which are not covered by the Physical
Mechanism game.
The broader scope of the AMEG does not preclude
students from playing the Physical Mechanism game. In
all of our interviews, no student got the right answer based
solely on intuition, though several wrong answers resulted
(this may be a result of the problem being uncommon in
daily life). The lack of answer after consulting both intu-
ition and memory results in students traversing the RA
path. It is possible that, had students more experience with
these problems, they could have traversed the AJ path more
frequently because of their intuitions (instead of their
memories), which might have resulted in students playing
the Physical Mechanism game.
Both the Mapping Meaning to Mathematics game and
the Mapping Mathematics to Meaning game are contained
in the same way that the Physical Mechanism game was
contained within the AMEG if certain choices are made at
certain points. There are similarities between the concep-
tual reasoning and do math section of the game that
have obvious similarities to the Mapping Meaning to
Mathematics game, or in the opposite direction, the same
comparison between do some math conceptual reasoning
and mapping mathematics to meaning. In this case again
they both have the same ontological components. In both
of these cases, students try to imagine the physical situ-
ation, and express their thoughts about it through math. Or
they start with a physics equation and then attempt to relate
physical meaning to that.
Finally, in regard to comparisons between the AMEG
and previous e-games, in our interviews students consis-
tently drew diagrams when they were trying to give a
conceptual explanation. During the interviews the students
drew free-body diagrams or a physical picture to help them
understand the physical situation that the problem was
describing. This is considered to be a tool students usually
employ when doing conceptual reasoning. However, it can
also be related to a previously identified e-game, which is
called Pictorial Analysis by Tuminaro and Redish.
The primary difference between AMEG and other pre-
vious games is the scope of the game: the AMEG includes
the option to enter into four previous e-games: Mapping
Meaning to Mathematics, Mapping Mathematics to
Meaning, Physical Mechanism game, and Pictorial
Analysis game during play. Each one of these games has
the possibility of occurring during the AMEG, but by
themselves they could not account for the complex process
of the students solving these problems in this context. For
this reason, we think of the AMEG as being like a super-
game which governs the order of which other games stu-
dents might play in the process of answer making.
VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
A. Difference between students
We found that different students will play this game
differently in different problems, often choosing different
paths through the game depending on the resources avail-
able to them. In general, two major points significantly
affect students’ reasoning and the moves they choose to
take. First, the problem they are working on can influence
students’ thinking. If students think the problem is simple
and the answer is ‘‘easy’’ to remember, they state their
answer quickly. However, their level of confidence is de-
pendent on being able to remember or construct some
justification for their answer. If they cannot remember
the answer or intuit one quickly, they will activate reason-
ing resources, which will decide the branches and hence
moves they take.
Even though our questions are conceptual, many stu-
dents attempt to solve them using algebra, so it is interest-
ing to touch on how students use math here. There is
substantial variation in their algebra skills: some students
try to avoid math altogether, spending more time with
conceptual proportional reasoning (for example, as with
Ohm’s p-prim [12]) without resorting to more formal
algebra. Other students progress more quickly through
the RA branch and use equations, subscripts, and other
trappings of formal algebra more readily. For complicated
questions, students of both kinds eventually have to use
equations. Based on our data, when students tend toward
many iterations of the do math move they often become
more confused and doubtful about their result the more
math they do.
B. Implications
The AMEG lends important insight into how students
solve conceptual problems. It covers four of the previous
e-games which all include the element of conceptual rea-
soning, describing students’ thinking processes which stu-
dents apply during their attempts at seeking a solution to
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problems. The fact that these students played this game so
readily when faced with multiple-choice and short-answer
physics questions suggests that they play this game com-
monly and that it is not unique to the interview setting or to
hydrostatics.
At its heart, it acknowledges that the students’ goal in
solving these problems is not (necessarily) displaying a
robust conceptual understanding, nor is it to reason through
the scenarios based on rigorous reasoning. The students’
goal is clear: answer the questions with minimal time or
effort. This clarity of goal may change depending on the
context with which the student is confronted. For example,
in a test setting the goal may be to ‘‘answer the questions
right in as much time as is allowed.’’ If investigating the
use of the AMEG in a different setting, this needs to be
considered. This answer-making frame leads students
through a succession of choices, which may be different
from what instructors or test designers desire.
For example, a common instructional gambit (in tutori-
als [13], for example, though widely used elsewhere) is to
have students answer a conceptual question and ‘‘explain
[their] reasoning.’’ Tutorial instructors sometimes have
difficulties encouraging students to adequately explain
their reasoning. We can describe the students’ strategy
using the AMEG. Answer-making students prefer produc-
ing an answer and then justifying it (the AJ branch) to
performing some reasoning which leads to an answer (the
RA branch). The question order in the tutorial further
encourages them to follow this path (answer first, then
explain reasoning). It is possible that reframing students’
involvement with tutorials (through curricular changes or
TA training, for example) will reduce students’ use of the
AMEG, but proposing and testing those changes is beyond
the scope of this paper.
C. Hydrostatics
In addition to the work on e-games, this project also has
implications for student understanding of hydrostatics.
Students answering questions in hydrostatics seem to
have a predilection for answering questions with intuitive
leaps. For example, Loverude describes students’ explan-
ations of a problem involving buoyancy of five blocks of
different mass as ‘‘It is possible that many explanations
were attempts to justify a prediction based on intuition,
rather than attempts to articulate a line of reasoning that
leads to a prediction.’’ [9].
The AMEG gives an insight into the workings of this
intuition justification strategy. In regard to specific con-
cepts, our interviews indicate that students believe that
water level does not change as long as conditions in a
container remain the same (no matter where the objects
stay in the water). Students applying the AMEG to this
type of problem consistently used this as a starting intuition
which they then tried to justify through conceptual reason-
ing. It remained durable even through reasoning and
justification.
Evidence from this study indicates that introductory
level students have a vague idea about Pascal’s principle,
which they do not apply consistently in a correct manner.
For example, most of them express that the pressure should
be equal at the same height from water level. However,
they inconsistently apply this belief when there are some
variations in the problem scenario, such as the different
shaped containers or different amount of fluid beneath the
point being considered.
This paper is part of a larger study of student thinking
across many introductory physics topics [14–16], and the
data discussed here are taken from validation interviews
for an instrument to test students’ understanding of
Archimedes’ principle and Pascal’s law. While our
claims are grounded in these topics, we believe the
AMEG is not unique to them. Further research is
necessary.
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